8 February 1941

8 February 1941


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8 February 1941

United States

Lend-Lease Bill is passed by 260 votes to 165 in the House of Representatives

North Africa

The first German transports leave Italy for North Africa

British and Australian troops capture El Agheila

France

Laval refuses an offer to rejoin Petain's cabinet



8th Division (Australia)

The 8th Division was an infantry division of the Australian Army, formed during World War II as part of the all-volunteer Second Australian Imperial Force. The 8th Division was raised from volunteers for overseas service from July 1940 onwards. Consisting of three infantry brigades, the intention had been to deploy the division to the Middle East to join the other Australian divisions, but as war with Japan loomed in 1941, the division was divided into four separate forces, which were deployed in different parts of the Asia-Pacific region. All of these formations were destroyed as fighting forces by the end of February 1942 during the fighting for Singapore, and in Rabaul, Ambon, and Timor. Most members of the division became prisoners of war, waiting until the war ended in late 1945 to be liberated. One in three died in captivity.


On the War Fronts

From The Militant, Vol. V No. 8, 22 February 1941, p.ف.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for the Encyclopaedia of Trotskyism On-Line (ETOL).

The Turkish-Bulgarian “non-aggression” pact is an indisputable victory for Axis diplomacy. It represents a retreat by Turkey from the edge of the conflict – and this retreat was certainly made at the orders and under the pressure of the Kremlin.

Up until a few days ago the Turks stoutly maintained in their controlled press that German entry into Bulgaria would bring the Turkish army into action in Thrace. British and Turkish staff parleys took place in Ankara. The situation was comparable to that in Moscow in August 1939, when Stalin entertained an Allied military mission – and confronted them with the Nazi-Soviet pact.

German infiltration into Bulgaria has already been in preparation for some weeks and the new pact between Turkey and Bulgaria seems to indicate that full military occupation of Bulgaria will take place without action by Turkey. There remains in the vagueness of the Turkish-Bulgar pact grounds for faint Allied hope that this is not the case. In London this hope was eagerly grasped and it was asserted that it could be “safely assumed” that Turkey would fulfill its obligations under its pact with Britain in the event of a German Balkan move. The Germans seem to think otherwise and in these matters they have usually proved to be the more correct.

The Turks have left themselves an exit in the pact by stating that it does not affect their obligations under other treaties. These obligations, however, mean that Turkey is supposed to enter the war in case at a German attack on Greece or the extension of the war to the Eastern Mediterranean. When Turkey failed to fulfill this promise upon Mussolini’s Greek more, the British put the best face possible on it and stated that Turkish non-belligerence was maintained by “mutual” agreement. But if in the present juncture Turkey stands aside to let Hitler move to Greece’s frontiers it means the loss of British positions in Southeastern Europe and the completion of continental consolidation by Hitler. For Greece will have to bow.

What the newspapers are most obscure about is the role undoubtedly played in this development by the Kremlin. There are reports which suggest that the pact is actually another “deal” between Stalin and Hitler under which Stalin forces Turkey to bow and Hitler promises to keep hands off the Dardanelles.

Other reports even say that Stalin threatened to march against Turkey’s eastern provinces unless it did give in to Hitler.

Just what sop Stalin got this time for his help remains to be revealed in the march of events. It is clear enough right now, however, that Stalin did put screws on the Turks. Involvement of Turkey in hostilities against Germany would have brought the Germans into action on still another Soviet frontier. German victory over the Turks would install them directly adjacent to the Caucasus and establish them on a second coast of the Black Sea. This is what Stalin fears and this is what he would seek to avoid in compelling Turkey to meet Hitler’s terms in return for a temporary and insecure “safety” from attack.


Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

Post by MarkN » 20 Feb 2016, 02:30

Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

Post by xristar » 20 Feb 2016, 02:34

Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

Post by MarkN » 20 Feb 2016, 02:37

Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

Post by MarkN » 20 Feb 2016, 02:52

Serbs and Greeks have a long and close history. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, was less close. Prince Paul was more interested in keeping the Germans out of Yugoslavia than he was in saving Greece. Prince Paul was more interested in keeping the Croats and Slovene's from revolting than defending Salonika.
What evidence?
Greece was attacked in October 1940. Yugoslavia did nothing.
Bitola (in Yugoslavia) was bombed by the Italians in November 1940. Yugoslavia did nothing.
The Germans entered Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Yugoslavia got closer to Germany.
The entire period, Greece was trying to get Yugoslavia to commit itself as an ally. Yugoslavia refused.

Papagos says that to move 3 divisions from Central/Eastern Macedonia to Western Macedonia would take 20 days. How do you expect the Yugoslavs to mobilise their forces properly between 27 March and 6 April? 10 days.

Remember Papagos, on 2 March, was refusing to move the divisions from the Rupel-Nestos position because he feared an attack within 10 days!

Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

Post by jwsleser » 20 Feb 2016, 03:34

Do we have sufficient evidence to decide if the Greek armies' morale collapsed because they were retreating from Albania or because they were being outflanked and encircled by the German advance?

Are you asking about withdrawing the forces in the east back to the Alaikmon lIne?

Then we disagree. Hopeless doesn't automatically make a decision irrational. I believe their decisions were rational. We have just barely begun to scratch the surface of the capabilities of the Greek Army in February-March 1941. This wasn’t the British Army or the German Army. It wasn’t a professional army. It was an infantry army with limited equipment that had been in heavy combat for 4 months with few replacement and limited supplies. When this army retreats, it leaves behind families and the resources of the nation. There is no Dunkirk for the Greeks. The UK forces never fought under these conditions in WW2.

So how is fighting to protect everyone irrational to retreating and still losing?

I will point out that since the Greeks didn't retreat, we will never know if retreat was better. That is Mark's logic at work.

How is fighting for a lost cause (Mark’s option) any different than fighting for success (fleeting as it might be)?

I don't know if I answer all your questions.

Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

Post by MarkN » 20 Feb 2016, 04:06

Defeat of the Italians was not on the table. An advance of 50km to shorten the front-line was all that was being considered and implemented. Even that was not achieved.

At what point during the offensive to get to the Valona-Berat line do you think it dawned on the Greek leaders that "defeat of the Italians" and "any hope of removing the Italians from the equation" were beyond their capabilities?

Albania was not Greek. A retreat from Albania did not leave families and resources of the nation behind. It was indeed the Greek Dunkirk - a place which had been British less distant in the past than North Epirus had been Greek.

Or, perhaps, you are starting to see the point I am making. Retreating from territory 'liberated' in Albania was a question of national pride. Remember, the families and resources were still not there. It was just the motivation that you describe.

Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

Post by jwsleser » 20 Feb 2016, 05:31

Next time do keep the context of the statements.

Do you check the dates in question before you posted?

No based on the fact the British couldn’t offer any real help. See 18 January and 8 February Greek notes which are referring to the available UK support of one artillery regiment, one mixed AA/AT regiment and a tank regiment. The Greeks saw no reason to risk German invasion over such limited support.

See above RE: Supply port. See Italian assessments.

I will point out that since the Greeks didn't retreat, we will never know if retreat was better. That is Mark's logic at work.

Wrong again! I have also pointed out we don't know for the very same reason. Again you argue based ipon your inventions.

Your killing me here. You have made judgments and assessed blame throughout this discussion. Dill is right, but it never happened. Defending the Metaxas Line as Pagpagos wanted to was wrong, but it never happened. The Greeks should have retreated because that would have been better, but that never happened.

So why are you right if everything you have claimed never happened? Because the reality didn’t work? So why are your opinions correct if they never happened?

So what have you been arguing Mark? Read you own posts for a change.

jwsleser wrote: How is fighting for a lost cause (Mark’s option) any different than fighting for success (fleeting as it might be)?

Mark: Did Papagos consider it a lost cause at the time? I thought you wanted to discuss what was known at the time, not what I may think in hindsight. Do make your mind up!

Okay Mark, lets play fully by those rules.

Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

Post by MarkN » 20 Feb 2016, 12:34

Waffle and misdirection intended to hide the reality that the Greek offensive was not intended to "defeat of the Italians" nor did it offer "any hope of removing the Italians from the equation". Valona was not the panacea that would bring defeat upon the Italians and remove them from the equation.

The Italians would still be in Albania, with or without control of the Valona, in greater numbers than the Greeks. The loss of Valona may hinder them tactically, it would not cause strategic failure.

The Greeks would still be required to man a frontline somewhere to counter this reality. And going on Papagos' words of the time, we can reasonably expect that frontline to contain the greater part of the Greek Army. At the very best, reaching the Valona-Berat line may have free'd up a division or two. Remember Papagos' words?

Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

Post by jwsleser » 20 Feb 2016, 15:15

I am asking this to insure I understand precisely where he is diverting from the current narrative, not that I fully agree with the current narrative. I feel he has changed/soften some of his positions so it is chance for him to cleanly lay out his argument.

If he wishes to merely cut and paste from his previous posts, I will understand that.

Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

Post by xristar » 20 Feb 2016, 17:57

Mark, you speak of an “established history”. What is that? Is there an established English language history of the Greek operations, either against Italy or Germany?

You claim that “that the Greek offensive was not intended to "defeat of the Italians" nor did it offer "any hope of removing the Italians from the equation"”. Where do you base that claim? Certainly, the Greek high command had drawn plans to cover the whole of Albania. The orders issued prior to the April 1941 were such. That the Greek forces would not suffice to implement them became apparent during the early months of 1941. However, already in January, there was the prospect of Yugoslavia joining the offensive in Albania. Mind you that in January the information that the Greek side had was of 15 Italian divisions in Albania. The rate at which the Italians were getting reinforced picked up through 1941. The Greek Army also kept feeding divisions into the fight. It was in February that it became felt that the Italians were getting the upper hand. Still there was optimism.

This is why I say that you rely on hindsight, contrary to your claims. You think of the situation as being static, when in fact everything kept changing.

You also flip reality around thinking that the Greek army was in Albania for nationalistic reasons, and that only post war operation reasons were invented. The truth is rather the opposite. In the discussions held among the senior leadership, things like “liberation” and “not budging an inch” do not appear. Yes, the honour of the Army was a factor, but do not overestimate its influence. The discussions centered around practical factors. Defensive lines, terrain, supply routes (a forgotten parameter, when we discuss of Thessaloniki), balance of forces etc

And let’s speak of the elephant in the room to which I hinted earlier in one of my posts. The Greek side, if not Papagos himself certainly the other senior leaders, always thought of the post-defeat arrangement. The Greek Army preferred to surrender intact and wholesale to Germans if that meant keeping the integrity of the land. Germany had no designs for Greece. Italy and Bulgaria had. Italy wanted to annex the Ionian islands, and propagandized (already pre-war mind you) for giving part of Greek Epirus to Albania (Tsamouria) and creating a Vlach independent state (the Pindos Principality).

Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

Post by jwsleser » 20 Feb 2016, 19:23

Let me take a moment to explain my comment. What I am referring to the professional discipline that allows an army to fight through the major difficulties. This is normally created through training and discipline over a long period of time. It is what allows armies to survive major set-backs, to follow orders that don't make sense to the soldier but make sense in terms of military operations, to hold positions and/or attack against impossible odds. It is the discipline keeps unit from disintegrating during retreats. It motivates the soldier as much if not more than fighting for home or other motivators. The men fought because they are soldiers, not because of (fill in the blank).

The Greek soldier is a positive story. Greece maintain a very small peacetime army. It was mainly a conscript force. Peacetime training was limited due to budget issues. Equipment was also limited due to budget which impacted training. The officer and NCO corps were small but professional. In all, the army had a small professional cadre of leaders with a very small corps of career soldiers. None of the units in peacetime were anywhere near their authorized strength requiring a large influx of conscripts and reserve officers and NCOs to fill their ranks.

In comparison, the German conscript received significantly more training, both in the training centers and in the unit-level training units, than most other armies. The Germans were able to rapidly create junior leaders with a well developed and strictly enforced training programs.

In the case of the UK/CW, those armies intentionally used unit loyalty to generate cohesion and discipline. The American Army was much like the Greek, a conscript army that needed an lot of work to become professional. Unlike Greece, America had the time and the resources to develop such an army.

The Greek Army was forged in battle, but had is weaknesses.The army rapidly mobilized at the start of the Italo-Greek War. A large number of reserve officers and NCOs were mobilized and/or created to fill the organizational structures. Because the army was mainly an infantry army fighting in terrain that greatly favored infantry and infantry tactics, the men quickly adapted to the nature of the fighting. Reading the personal accounts of this period, you find comments about the leaders and men trying to master the needed skills while in the middle of fighting a war. You read issues of indiscipline, difficulty in controlling the men, etc. These are common problems when building an army during a war. They happen.

Greece quickly exhausted its trained reserve manpower. Units were under-strength and new replacements in those units required training. The units created in 1941 had many shortcomings. Few experienced cadres from units that had been in combat were released to form these units. Training was hasty and incomplete.

This is why the army was brittle. Its combat skills were good, mastered in combat, but its discipline was based on success. Training was based on experience rather than learned in training centers. The soldiers become despondent and units lost cohesion when discipline couldn't counter the set-backs. The fighting in the east against the Germans display the differences. The prewar divisions and forts, even after they sent drafts to Albania as replacements, did well. They had time to train, integrate new men into the units, and master their skills and prepare for the fight. The newly raised units started to break part before combat. Moving the XIX and 20th Divisions saw a breakdown in cohesion during the moves. The units in Albania became despondent and began to break-up as they moved rearward.

I hope this help you to understand my comment.

Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

Post by jwsleser » 21 Feb 2016, 20:46

To provide clarity, I will present my analysis of Mark’s points and my rebuttal. If Mark feels that I omitted or misrepresented anything, he can post a clarifying comment.

I see two distinct periods in this timeline: The period up to 2 March 1941 and the period after 2 March. I will offer my position using that structure. I will address the former here.

I would like to highlight two points before I start. The first is that this entire discussion has been hampered by the lack of Greek records. Mark has decided that nothing except the few historical records are acceptable. Papgos’ postwar writing are judged by him as "Interestingly, Papagos writes post war that it would take 20 days to move these troops to new positions. That, to me, sounds like more historical revisionism which appears prolific in his and others' writings on the matter." I have taken the position that Papagos’ writings are valid unless challenged by other equally creditable sources. To do otherwise is to silence one of the few pertinent Greek sources available to us.

The second is that neither Mark nor I have come anywhere close to the level of research needed to answer this question. Mark’s position is to disregard all previous research and use the few snippets of the historical record to support his position. I will rely on the fact that research by previous writers on this topic didn’t identify the issue that Mark has argued. This by itself doesn’t invalidate Mark’s position, but it does require Mark to bring ‘something new to the table’ other than the same materials those writers offered. They examined documents and did interviews we will never replicate and which informed their writing. Nothing in all that material led them to believe their interpretation of the events in question was wrong, and we haven’t seen/read all the materials that support their arguments.

Mark’s argument for the time before 4 March is mainly based on one factor General Papagos’ assessment of Greek courses of action in case of a German attack. He claims that since Papagos didn’t follow his own assessment of the situation, that Pagagos was incompetent, guilty of wishing thinking, etc. But what Mark never establishes is the raison d’etrê of that assessment why did Papagos write it? Is it, as Mark implies and his argument requires, a general outline of Greek defensive options that were meant to be implemented by the Greek Army alone from the out break of the war, or was it an assessment developed solely to discuss defensive plans predicated on the availability of UK support? It is the latter that I will demonstrate is the case.

I will first note that Mark used my date of 8 February as the date of the assessment. That was wrong and that error is mine. I was trying to determine a date for the assessment and used the date that actually indicated the start of development. As we were discussing the Tatoi Meeting and impact of Yugoslavia on Anglo-British decision making, this wasn't important. Since Mark is now using it as an a example of Papagos's incompetence, that actual date is now important.

Even using a date of 8 February, it doesn't change the argument below. When I discussed the COAs on the first page of this thread, the context was clearly the Tatoi meeting and working with the UK forces. Nothing was said or implied that the COAs reflect a Greek-only assessment. In fact just a few posts later (my bold):

jwsleser » 15 Jan 2016, 20:02

Mark: Or did the Greeks think they could fight off the Germans with a handful of scratch divisions?

Jeff: No they didn’t. Look again at the three options outlined by Pagagos. All three options were based on the UK support that was beginning to flow.

That should have resolved any ambiguity.

The COAs don’t appear in Papagos’ assessment of 1940. They are not mentioned or discussed during the January meetings, nor the events leading up to the 8 February. The first time we see the COAs is the 22 February meeting. Papagos states that

Papagos couldn’t have been inconsistent and was intentionally ignoring his own analysis because 1) the analysis weren't developed until the 8-22 February time-frame 2) it addressed the use of Greco-British forces, not a general defense plan of Greece without UK support. In fact, Papagos was following his 1940 assessment which stated that offensive action against the Italians was required to address the situation (pages 208-214). Papagos was in face consistent and he was following his own analysis.

A secondary point that Mark has raised during this time is the issue of Alexandros Koryzis’ statement/confusion about the timing of any Greek request for UK assistance. Koryzis wasn’t part of the government before being asked to be the Prime Minister (he was the governor of the Bank of Greece). This happened during the chaos created in the aftermath of Metaxas’ unexpected death, requiring that Kroyziś be selected and notified, hand over his duties at the bank, and then get rapidly ‘spun-up’ on all aspects of the government, not only the military situation. The Greeks quickly cleared up this issue by 8 February (9 days). Where Mark wishes to make this a significant example of Greek duplicity and deception, I see it as an honest error, quickly rectified. More important, the Greeks requested and accepted UK assistance on 22 February, 8 days before the Germans crossed into Bulgaria. If this is an example of duplicity and confusion, it was the duplicity and confusion the UK wanted.

A new issue recently cropped up: the issue of the Italians and purpose of the Greek February offensive. I made a statement that the Greeks wanted to resolve the Italian situation. Mark countered by stating the Greeks couldn’t resolve the situation and cited the Greek military objective (Valona) and the conversation with the Greek King to support his argument.

To the issue of the military objective. As we don’t have the Greek operational order, we will never resolve this issue to any satisfaction. I will counter that orders/objectives reflect a period of time/activities that can be reasonably predicted/controlled. The UK order for Operation Compass didn’t embrace how Tripoli would be secured. The Allied order for Operation Neptune didn’t address how the Allies were planning to capture Berlin. Valona was a reasonable objective that offer significant military advantage if gained. Capturing Valona doesn’t mean operations are over, just that they will transition into a new phase. During the course of the operation opportunity might arise to make greater gains.

The capture of Valona itself would significantly reduce Italian military capability. While not the preferred endstate, it would allow the Greeks to reduce forces on that front, a desirable outcome in itself. Any Italian pursuit once the Greeks were forced to withdrawal by the Germans would be hampered by the need to regain and put this port back into service.

To say that Greek offense wouldn't provide any military advantage is false.

I will only briefly address the King’s comments. I don’t have the book, so I can’t read the details of the entire event. This is a political head of state discussing military operations with a foreign ambassador. The King could have been managing expectations, something that is certainly reasonable and expected when the situation is uncertain. The King could have said ‘we hope to kick the Italians out of Albania but it is more likely that we will gain a better defensive position’. I submit that this reasoning is more inline with the nature of these discussions than the King providing specific military details. Without a complete transcript to set the context, it is difficult to judge this passage. BTW, I shouldn’t need to remind everyone of Mark’s position on the validity of postwar memoirs.

Mark claims that the military situation was unwinnable and that the Yugoslavia military wasn't reliable. He states that Papagos should have know that and made decisions based on this understanding. Mark has not provided any period documents supporting that line of reasoning. I have posted documents demonstrating that the situation wasn't seen as unwinnable, that Yugoslavia was seen a valued Ally, and several that stated Yugoslavia could be a game changer.

The issue of Greek pride and retaining as much of Albania as they could. Given the 1940 assessment clearly states offensive action in Albania against the Italians, no inconsistency here. It is clear that no withdrawal option was discussed/planned prior to 22 February (actually 2 March). I am prepared to discuss whether the option to withdraw Greek forces prior to the 22 February meeting from Albania made military sense. I don’t feel it is necessary to do so at this time as it doesn't support Mark's position.

In all, the facts don't support Mark's interpretation of these events. I feel Occam's Razor applies in those areas were we lack definitive information. While there might be data out there that could change my thoughts on this issue, they haven't been presented here.

I also will not discuss the events of 2 March and after at this time. I feel we need to keep the discussion focused so it doesn’t go all over the map. If Mark feels there is support for his position prior to that date, he can present it now.


Asia Pacific 1904: Attack on Port Arthur

The 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance freed Japan from the fear of war with a coalition of European powers. Emboldened, they moved to expel the Russians from Manchuria, attacking the Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur in 1904.

Treaty Ports

Treaty ports - the small unlabelled circles on the map - were towns opened to foreign trade by unequal treaties in China, Japan, and Korea. Foreigners operating within treaty ports enjoyed extraterritoriality, being subject to their home country&rsquos laws. Unlike concessions such as Hong Kong, these territories were not directly leased by the foreign powers and did not have sizable foreign garrisons.

Only treaty ports that were opened by treaty and used are shown on the maps. Treaty ports are also not generally shown in places which are already covered by concessions or under occupation. Treaty ports are not shown after the 1911 Chinese Revolution, although they continued on into the 1940s.

Yangtze River

By the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin (1858), foreign vessels including warships had the right to free navigation on the Yangtze River. In practical terms, this right extended only as far as Yichang until 1900, when advances in steam navigation allowed access as far inland as Chongqing.

Main Events

? Feb 1902–7 Mar 1910 Dutch settle New Guinea frontier▲

In response to British protests that Marind-Anim from Dutch New Guinea were raiding British New Guinea and the Torres Strait Islands, the Dutch built a post near the border at Merauke. Later in 1902, the Dutch tried to set up a border commission with German New Guinea, but this was rejected by the Germans on the grounds that neither country had settlements in the region. The Dutch built Hollandia by the German border in 1910. in wikipedia

8 Apr 1902 Russia-China Convention▲

At the Russia-China Convention, the Russian Empire agreed to withdraw from Manchuria in three six month stages. They undertook the first stage—withdrawing from west of the River Liao—on 29 April 1902. However, the Russians made no movement to complete the remaining two stages, intended to begin with a withdrawal from Mukden and Kirin. in wikipedia

16 Apr 1902 End of Philippine-American War▲

Filipino guerrilla General Miguel Malvar surrendered to US General Franklin Bell in Tanauan, Batangas, after being surrounded by US and cooperating Philippine forces. This action effectively brought an end to the Philippine-American War, although sporadic and low level resistance would continue for almost a decade. On 4 July 1902, US President Theodore Roosevelt granted a complete pardon and amnesty to all participants in the conflict. in wikipedia

26 May–4 Jun 1902 Pacification of Taiwan▲

Japanese authorities ordered ‘pacified bandits’—those who had accepted amnesty in 1900 but were suspected of continuing resistance—to assemble at six points in southern Taiwan. Those who obeyed the order were shot the others were hunted down in the following days, with the Japanese killing rebel leader Lin Shao-mao and his followers on 31 May. The rebellion was officially declared at an end on 4 June. in wikipedia

13 Dec 1903–3 Aug 1904 British expedition to Tibet▲

Colonel Francis Younghusband led an expedition from British India to Tibet—a nominal part of the Chinese Empire—to establish diplomatic relations, resolve the Tibet-Sikkim border dispute, and preempt possible Russian designs on the country. When the Tibetans resisted the incursion, the British fought their way into Lhasa with their modern weaponry only to find that the Dalai Lama had fled to China. in wikipedia

8–9 Feb 1904 Battle of Port Arthur▲

The Empire of Japan launched a squadron of destroyers on a surprise night attack against the Russian fleet anchored at Port Arthur, Manchuria. Engagements continued over the following morning, ending at midday when the Japanese withdrew. Although neither side had lost any major ships in the battle, the Russians were ill-equipped to repair their damages. The next day, on 10 February, the Japanese declared war, formally beginning the Russo-Japanese War. in wikipedia


Singapore falls to Japan

Singapore, the “Gibraltar of the East” and a strategic British stronghold, falls to Japanese forces.

An island city and the capital of the Straits Settlement of the Malay Peninsula, Singapore had been a British colony since the 19th century. In July 1941, when Japanese troops occupied French Indochina, the Japanese telegraphed their intentions to transfer Singapore from the British to its own burgeoning empire. Sure enough, on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack, 24,000 Japanese troops were transported from Indochina to the Malay Peninsula, and Japanese fighter pilots attacked Singapore, killing 61 civilians from the air.

The battle between Japanese and British forces on the Malay Peninsula continued throughout December and January, killing hundreds more civilians in the process. The British were forced to abandon and evacuate many of their positions, including Port Swettenham and Kuala Lumpur.

On February 8, 5,000 Japanese troops landed on Singapore Island. Pro-Japanese propaganda leaflets were dropped on the islands, encouraging surrender. On February 13, Singapore’s 15-inch coastal guns–the island’s main defensive weapons–were destroyed. Tactical miscalculations on the part of British Gen. Arthur Percival and poor communication between military and civilian authorities exacerbated the deteriorating British defense. Represented by General Percival and senior Allied officers, Singapore surrendered to Japanese Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita in front of Japanese newsreel cameras. Sixty-two thousand Allied soldiers were taken prisoner more than half eventually died as prisoners of war.


8 February 1941 - History

Alabama - 38 (Head Coach: Hank Crisp)

PlayerFGFTFTAPFPts
Noah Seals10032
Louis Adair40018
Wheeler Leeth23437
Veo Storey523112
Jim Roth03543
Bob LaPolla11303
John Hines00010
Sam Sharp01211
Bill Finnegan10012
Totals 14 10 17 15 38

Kentucky - 46 (Head Coach: Adolph Rupp)

PlayerFGFTFTAPFPts
Lloyd Ramsey00010
Ermal Allen712415
Melvin Brewer01301
Carl Staker11103
Marvin Akers422310
Lee Huber22306
James King11323
Waller White02212
Milt Ticco00000
Keith Farnsley22316
Totals 17 12 19 12 46

Halftime Score: Kentucky 23, Alabama 22
Officials: Bowser Chest (Nashville) and Ralph Mills (Hopkinsville)
Attendance: 3000
Arena: Alumni Gymnasium
References: Lexington Herald

Lloyd Ramsey (#6) shoots circus shot off one foot that rolls off the rim. Looking on left to right are Kentucky's Jim King, Alabama's Louis Adair (with noseguard), Wheeler Leeth and Toby Seals


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Stephenville Empire-Tribune (Stephenville, Tex.), Vol. 71, No. 8, Ed. 1 Friday, February 21, 1941

Weekly newspaper from Stephenville, Texas that includes local, state, and national news along with advertising.

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sixteen pages : ill. page 25 x 17 in. Digitized from 35 mm. microfilm.

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Creator: Unknown. February 21, 1941.

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  • Main Title: Stephenville Empire-Tribune (Stephenville, Tex.), Vol. 71, No. 8, Ed. 1 Friday, February 21, 1941
  • Serial Title:Stephenville Empire-Tribune

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Weekly newspaper from Stephenville, Texas that includes local, state, and national news along with advertising.

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sixteen pages : ill. page 25 x 17 in.
Digitized from 35 mm. microfilm.

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City of Stephenville Newspaper Collection

The City of Stephenville Newspaper Collection hosts the newspaper history of Stephenville, including the Stephenville Empire, the Stephenville Tribune, the Stephenville Empire-Tribune, and the weekly student newspaper from Tarleton State University, the J-TAC.

Stephenville Empire-Tribune

The Stephenville Empire-Tribune Collection represents three titles: the Stephenville Empire and the Stephenville Tribune, which were competing publications, and a third title, the Stephenville Empire-Tribune, created upon merger of the two in 1929. Editorials in these newspapers offer information of special interest, as they provide an important means for gauging local opinions on historical events.

Tocker Foundation Grant

Collections funded by the Tocker Foundation, which distributes funds principally for the support, encouragement, and assistance to small rural libraries in Texas.

Texas Digital Newspaper Program

The Texas Digital Newspaper Program (TDNP) partners with communities, publishers, and institutions to promote standards-based digitization of Texas newspapers and to make them freely accessible.


On February 9, 1941: A Page Out of Papal History

Throughout the events (of WW II) Montini was sustained by his genuine love and admiration for Pius XII. If he felt lonely, he could appreciate the still deeper solitude of Pius, cut off by war from the non-Italian cardinals, alone. One vignette sums up Montini’s almost mystical regard for the papal office.

On the evening of 9 February 1941 Pius took Montini down to the crypt of St. Peter’s where the tomb of Pius XI had just been completed, two years after his death. The Pope lingered a long time, Montini wrote, praying and commenting on what he saw. Then he prayed at the tombs of Pius X and Benedict XV. Montini reflects:

Never had the communion of saints and the spiritual genealogy of the successors of Christ been given, it seemed to me, a more moving expression. And that is very consoling. The Church, this living reality, spiritual and visible, is more present than ever, more modern and necessary than ever may God who unties and teaches us all be praised.

Pius knew he would be entombed here in this crypt Montini did not yet know that he would be buried here too. But this experience affected Montini’s idea of the papacy forever. It was an exalted idea of the papal office that other Christians found hard to understand. It placed the pope at the heart of the communion of saints. If anything good were to come out of the tragedy of war, it would be a Church purified.

Paul VI by Peter Hebblethwaite, pp. 159 – 160

Pope St. Paul VI, we remember you in love. Pray for us!

Holy Father, Pius XII, we honor your memory and the gift of your life to our Church.


File #1131: "8 - CAP Bibliography, 1941-91.pdf"

Th* t:aterial Fre*errted hereirr represents a truly outstandingr
resource for the researcher engaged in the study of the Hist*r'y
*f th* i:ivi I Ait' Fatr'*1 , Il* ni-l$lerrrus ritati,:ns cover' the f ielci
in a manner unprecedented for a volunteer par'amiiital'y L't''l,laiiisation.
i:'=r th+ pa*t ,:*verཥ y*ar'=
pleasure to
hras tleen rrry
'rre assoc i ated wi th the author it For the rnost distincti s
part th a=,Eoc i at i ur:
.
,,r:l beerr related to our rnutual undying goal to preserve the rich
history of one of the world's rru-rst unir'-iJ,lirisa.tl+lr*, the Civii Air Patrol. He has beerr a sour'ce of errcouraqernent to.my personai ef forts irr behalf .-,f .rur lfiLltlral guai, Itr itia!-l-y
i:a=trF he has procided me into doing what shouid. be done. Hii
professional approach, both to the mater-iaI at hand. and t+ tir*
ather' of his several Civil Air Patrol endeavors has been an
inspiration to ai I mernbers of the National Histc,r-icaI (_lurirriiitt*e
of that organization.
T+ *ay that this is a monumentai undertaking is a gross understatemerrt. The amount of personal sacrif ice arrd ci*dii:atiun invc'lved in an undertaking of this nature on a volunteer basis can
rlot be quantified, rror call it adequately be conrpen*at-ecl. It r:*ulcl
have CIrrly been undertaken by an individual, such as the author,
who has a basic phi losophy which I ies in ser'vice to hls f ei 1,:w
man.

LESTER E. HOPPER
COL
CAP
New Orleans, Lor.tisiana
L August 199L

The Periodical Literature

Civil Air Patrol was founded I

This publication is therefore dedjcated to the thousands upon thousands of
1oya1 and faithful Cjvjl Ajr Patrol members who, over the years sjnce tlorld t.lar
II, have given of their time, their money, and in some cases their 1ives, in

of the defense of this country, and, 'in support of the three
Congressi onal 1y-mandated mi ss j ons of th'i s organi zat'ion: Cadet Programs,
support

Aerospace Education, and Emergency Servjces.
To

those who have gone before

"Life can only be understood backwards
but it must be lived forwards."
Li

Soren Kierkegaard
l8l3 - 1855

PART I
THE PERIODICAL LITERATURE

of
the ljterature published about
the Civil Air Patrol as found
in the major American indexes
to the periodical literature.

chronol ogi ca'l bi bl i ography

This portjon of the Bib'liography was begun in mid-1987 after accidentally finding some references to the Civil Air Patrol 'in several standard American jndexes to the periodical ljterature.
Throughout the balance of 1987, and the first half of 1988, the search contjnued. As more and more citations h,ere found, jnterest and curiosity grew. The
search was widened to'include non-print indexes. This jmmedjately resulted
'in the d'iscovery of a surprisingly large number of nonperiodical items ( books,
journals, maps, filmstrips, sound record'ings, reports, government documents,
theses, etc. ), as well as many more periodical citations.

In May, 1988, feeling that this informatjon was too'interesting and valuable to
keep in my personal file, the Maryland l,ling Historjcal Program Offjce issued
this portion of the Bjbliography as HP0P (Historical Program Offjce Publjcation) 88-1, without the Subject and Source indexes. Copies were issued to all
unit historians jn the Maryland Wing as well as to key l,ljng command and staff
personnel. Immediately thereafter, work began on preparing the nonperiodical
port'i on for s i mi I ar rel ease .

is required regarding the citat'ion arrangement. Origina11y, these citatjons were kept on 3x5 file cards. To keep them in chronological order, an
identjfy'ing number was placed jn the upper left hand corner of each indjvidual
card. This number represented the date of publication. It was in the format
YYMMDD (Year, Month, Day). Thus, 570123 would represent an artjcle pubfished
on 23 January 1957. This scheme works very we'll for journal, magazine, and
newspaper items. When the cjtat'ions were jnput to a PC data set, using a
software program wjth no sort capability, this identifying scheme was retajned.
As a result, the reader wil1, occasionally, find the'index entry referring to
more than one citation. It should not prove difficult to determine whjch
ci tati on 'is bei ng referred to.
A word

Another word to the reader. Bibliographies are, by their very nature, neither
absolutely accurate nor comprehensive. The citations presented here were obtajned from published indexes. Not all journals, magazines, or newspapers are
indexed. tlhen these publications are indexed, not all of the included articles
are necessarily'indexed. The cho'ice of what'is'indexed'is the prerogative of
the publisher. Ali publishers operate under limjtations of scope and coverage
determined by their chosen, or percejved, marketplace. Additionally there is
also the problem of lag-time. An artjcle jndexed today may not appear in print
for sjx months, perhaps a year. One cannot say, then, with any certainty, th0t, as of a given cut-off date, all jtems on a topic have been located and identified. If you, personally, know of some CAP citatjon which does not appear
here, don't be upset. It may never have been jndexed in a major American in-

I
dexing publicatjon (print or non-print),
pl ete'ly arbi trary cut-off date.

numbers followed by the + sign indicate late additjons provided
by LtC Hellenmarie l.lalker,0regon [,ljng Historian and Member, National Historical Conmittee. As we were already well beyond our estimated publication deadljne, these citations were input "as recejved." I wish to publical)y thank her
for her most generous contributions to th'is work.

I would like to personally thank Col Lester E. Hopper, Cjvil Air Patrol National Historjan, for his support in the publication of this bibliography. I am
afrajd I severely tested his long-suffering, but understanding, nature. For
that I wjsh to offer him my sjncere pubf ic apology.
I hope thjs bibliography will prove useful. If, in any sma11 way, it does,
then the time and effort that has gone into jts production shall have been
worth while.
I would greatly appreciate being informed of any errors, or ommissions, that
YOu, the reader, may become aware of. You comments should be addressed to me
at my home address: 1339 Butterf'ly Lane, Frederick, Maryland 21702.

LtC Donald C. Borton
Frederi

Robb l,l j l son) 0n need
New York T'imes September
(Gi l


Watch the video: Военый фильм 1941 1945 HD


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  5. Redd

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